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Abstract In Carnap’s autobiography, he tells the story how one night in January
1931, “the whole theory of language structure” in all its ramifications “came to [him]
like a vision”. The shorthandmanuscript he produced immediately thereafter, he says,
“was the first version” ofLogical Syntax of Language. This document, which has never
been examined since Carnap’s death, turns out not to resemble Logical Syntax at all,
at least on the surface. Wherein, then, did the momentous insight of 21 January 1931
consist? We seek to answer this question by placing Carnap’s shorthand manuscript
in the context of his previous efforts to accommodate scientific theories and meta-
linguistic claims withinWittgenstein’s Tractatus theory of meaning. The breakthrough
of January 1931 consists, from this viewpoint, in the rejection of the Tractatus theory
in favor of the meta-mathematical perspective of Hilbert, Gödel, and Tarski. This was
not yet the standpoint of the published Logical Syntax, as we show, but led naturally
to the “principle of tolerance” and thus to Carnap’s mature philosophy, in which the
inconsistencies between this first view and the principle of tolerance, which survived
into the published Syntax, were overcome.
Keywords Rudolf Carnap · Kurt Gödel · Ludwig Wittgenstein · Logical Syntax of
Language · Vienna Circle
Descartes recorded the content of his famous three dreams, often regarded as the
origin of a new chapter in philosophy, in some detail. Carnap’s dream, the origin of a
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more recent chapter,1 has come down to us in more fragmentary form, and requires
some detective work to reconstruct:
After thinking about these problems for several years, the whole theory of
language structure and its possible applications in philosophy came to me like
a vision during a sleepless night in January 1931, when I was ill. On the fol-
lowing day, still in bed with a fever, I wrote down my ideas on forty-four
pages under the title “Attempt at a Metalogic”. These shorthand notes were
the first version of my book Logical Syntax of Language. (Carnap, 1963, p. 53)
Just what was Carnap’s “vision” during the sleepless night of 21 January 1931? What
problems did it solve? And what were the “possible applications to philosophy” that
made the idea so exciting?
The actual “Attempt at aMetalogic” (Versuch einerMetalogik, henceforthVersuch)
that Carnap wrote down the following day has apparently never been consulted to
answer to these questions. However, it has been preserved, and provides important
evidence.2 On the surface, it does not in the least resemble the Logical Syntax of
which it is supposedly the “first version”. Only when we compare it with the view
Carnap had been struggling toward previously do we understand the magnitude of
the change in his conception. It is on reconstructing this pre-1931 view, accordingly,
that we first concentrate.
An obstacle that has made this view difficult to appraise, or even state, is the large
role played in it by certain ideas from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. From the beginning,
this book has attracted more interpretive interest than has the Vienna Circle, whose
understanding of the book has therefore—we think somewhat unfairly—been clas-
sified as either a pale shadow or as an outright misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s
doctrines. We think this traditional view3 misleading because it takes for granted
that the Vienna Circle’s first priority was a correct understanding of Wittgenstein’s
own intentions. In fact, of course, the Vienna Circle, including Carnap, had been led
to something like Wittgenstein’s ideas from very different starting points, and they
used whatever came to hand to address their problems, which were not Wittgen-
stein’s. But in arriving at a provisional solution to those problems in the 1920s, certain
1 The Logical Syntax is usually regarded as the origin of the “linguistic turn” in analytic philosophy;
see e.g. the editor’s introduction in Rorty’s collection The Linguistic Turn (Rorty, 1967).
2 Of the original shorthand document, pp. 1–23 and 44 are preserved in the Carnap Papers (Man-
uscript Collection No. 1029) held by the Special Collections Department, Young Research Library,
University of California at Los Angeles (henceforth abbreviated “UCLA/ RC1029”), Box 4, folder
CM14, item 1.
3 Which now takes the updated form of claiming that the Tractatus has been wrongly interpreted
because it has been mistakenly assimilated to Carnap’s different conception. James Conant, for
instance, attributes to early Wittgenstein the idea that meaning is in the mind of the speaker or
the writer, without whom the mere physical sign is not a symbol; the meaning relation (putting
the symbol into the sign) is established only in the minds of human interlocutors (Conant, 2001,
pp. 24–28). Whether a sign or a sentence has meaning cannot be objectively determined, according to
this view, i.e. cannot be determined outside the context of its use and the intentions of its users. This
view of Wittgenstein has been obscured, Conant says, by its assimilation to Carnap’s very different
conception of meaning: “Carnap seeks a method that will furnish criteria that permit one to establish
that someone else is speaking nonsense, whereas Wittgenstein (both early and later) seeks a method
that ultimately can only be practiced by someone on himself. Wittgenstein’s method only permits the
verdict that sense has not been spoken to be passed by the one who speaks.” (ibid., p. 61) Carnap,
of course, understood Wittgenstein as concerned also with objective meaning rather than with the
mental states or intentions of speakers; Hacker (2003) thinks Carnap was right and Conant is wrong;
see also Proops (2001).
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ideas from the Tractatus were of great significance to them. So the Vienna Circle view
described in the first part of this paper is neitherWittgenstein’s nor notWittgenstein’s.4
Our first priority will be to describe this view and show how deeply and intensely
the Circle grappled, despite its own very different agenda, with certain basic ideas of
theTractatus. The early Vienna Circle based its criterion ofmeaning onWittgenstein’s
picture theory, on his conception of language as exhaustively determined by rules, and
on a universal language of the kind suggested by the Tractatus. We will argue that
it was precisely Carnap’s attempt to expand the scope of such a language structure,
and the tension between this effort and developments within mathematical logic, that
set the scene for the “breakthrough” to the syntax idea that Carnap describes so
dramatically as having come to him “like a vision”.
This breakthrough, however, as we describe in the following, led first to a rather
different doctrine from that of the published Syntax 3 years later. This initial syntax
idea, which found expression in only one of Carnap’s publications,5 was expounded
systematically in a series of unpublished manuscripts written in the spring of 1931,6
culminating in three lectures to the Vienna Circle in the summer of 1931, and the
first draft of what we know as the Logical Syntax, written in the autumn of 1931 and
early 1932. Here Carnap attempted a definition of analyticity that would preserve
Wittgenstein’s idea of tautology in the new syntactic environment. This attempt was,
however, subjected to a probing criticism by Gödel, who pointed out a fundamental
flaw in Carnap’s exposition. In the late autumn of 1932, Carnap responded to this
criticism by abruptly altering the fundamental doctrine of the book. The leading idea
now became the celebrated “principle of tolerance,” which would henceforth become
a principal theme of Carnap’s thought. In the published Syntax (1934), the original
syntax idea of the first draft and the principle of tolerance co-exist in an uneasy
truce. This would not last; by the following year, Carnap had allowed that the meta-
language for science could be semantic as well as syntactic. So part of the specifically
syntactic doctrine of the 1934 book, arrived at in the initial breakthrough of January
1931, would turn out to be ephemeral, while the principle of tolerance became the
cornerstone of Carnap’s mature philosophy.
But it was no accident that Carnap’s formulation of the principle of tolerance grew
out of the original syntax view. In Sect. 2, we formulate this original syntax view, using
a number of previously unknown documents. They tell a clear story. Against this
background, we then argue, Gödel’s critique of the first draft of the Syntax becomes
more comprehensible. We also argue that Gödel’s critique played an important role
in motivating Carnap’s radical step toward tolerance in late 1932. Finally, we discuss
the tension between the original syntax idea of January 1931 and the principle of
tolerance in the published book, and identify which elements of the original idea
were preserved in Carnap’s later development. We also suggest that the fundamental
4 That it is not straightforwardly Wittgenstein’s we think the voluminous literature on the Tractatus
(see previous footnote) makes adequately clear. That it is not not Wittgenstein’s is attested to by
several members of the Vienna Circle themselves; Carnap, for instance, said in his autobiography,
“For me personally, Wittgenstein was perhaps the philosopher who, besides Russell and Frege, had
the greatest influence on my thinking.” (Carnap, 1963, p. 25).
5 The famous paper “Die physikalische Sprache als Universalsprache derWissenschaft” (1932), later
translated into English, with a new preface, as the pamphlet The Unity of Science (1934); this original
syntax view is also in the background of Carnap’s (1931) critique of Heidegger, “Überwindung der
Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache”.
6 These shorthand manuscripts are preserved in UCLA/RC1029, Box 3, folders CM10 and CM11.
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nature of the break that occurred in January 1931 has important consequences for the
interpretation of the later Carnap, which even some of his closest readers seem not
yet to have fully appreciated.
1 A new foundation of logic
The Tractatus was the undisputed point of departure for the Vienna Circle because
in their view, Wittgenstein had solved the age-old Platonic problem of the cognitive
status of mathematics, which remained a grave threat to any form of empiricism. “It
really does seem on first sight as if the very existence of mathematics must mean the
failure of pure empiricism—as if we had in mathematics a knowledge about the world
that doesn’t come from experience, as if we had a priori knowledge,” Hans Hahn had
said. “And this evident difficulty for empiricism is so plain, so brutal, that anyone
who wants to hold a consistent empiricism has to face this difficulty. . .” (Hahn, 1929,
pp. 55–56).Wittgenstein had solved this problem. Though he had adopted Frege’s and
Russell’s all-encompassing conception of logic as universally applicable and inescap-
able, he rejected the view that the logical laws were something like the most general
laws of nature, or the laws of thought. For Wittgenstein, logical laws were not laws
of something, that pertained to a universe of objects and expressed transparently in
language along with other sorts of facts. Instead, language itself was recognized as a
medium, as not part of the world but as representing the world to us. It represented
the world to us, Wittgenstein thought, by means of logical pictures isomorphic to
facts in the world. Frege’s conception of logic as a gap-free system of rules, then, was
extended to the whole of language, and connected to the world by this picture theory
of meaning (Ricketts, 1996a, pp. 69–80).
The truths of logic were a by-product of this representational function of language.
They ceased to be part of what languages describes, and became instead an artifact of
the representational capacity of language. As such, logical truths became tautological
and empty, despite still being universal (ibid., pp. 59–64). Hahn, like the rest of the
Vienna Circle, thought this idea of critical importance:
If one wants to regard logic—as this has in fact been done—as the study
of the most general qualities of objects, as the study of objects in general
[überhaupt], then empiricism would in fact be confronted here with an impass-
able hurdle. In reality, though, logic says nothing whatever about objects. Logic
is not something that is to be found in the world. Logic only arises, rather,
when—by means of a symbolism—we speak about the world. . . The sentences
of logic say nothing about the world. (Hahn, 1929, pp. 56–57)
Of course the Vienna Circle did not simply accept Wittgenstein’s view as stated in
the Tractatus. “We learned much by our discussions of the book,” Carnap later wrote,
“and acceptedmany views as far as we could assimilate them to our basic conceptions.”
(Carnap, 1963, pp. 24–25, our emphasis) In particular, the Circle gave the Tractatus
view an epistemological and positivistic twist, by interpreting the “atomic sentences”
as elementary observation sentences. And they also combined it with logicism, so
that the empty and tautological status Wittgenstein accorded logic was thereby also
transmitted to all of mathematics. Naturally, they did not distinguish their version
of Wittgenstein from Wittgenstein’s own; to them it was a single and interlocking
complex of ideas.
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But even with these modifications, Wittgenstein’s solution to the old problems car-
ried a high price tag for the Vienna Circle. Two costly by-products of this solution
were particularly unpalatable. The first of these problems arose from the Circle’s own
proposal to extendWittgenstein’s truth-functional language structure to mathematics
(by means of logicism) and thereby to make it the basis of their unified language
of science. For it seemed to them that the Tractatus did not allow for unbounded
quantification, and this left it insufficient for expressing even a fragment of actually
existing science. Indeed, it seemed that most theoretical science, and most classical
mathematics, could not be expressed, or had no meaning, within (their understanding
of) the Tractatus framework.7
The second problem concerned the status of the fundamental doctrines themselves,
which seemed to fall victim to their own consequences. This was much discussed at
the meetings of the Vienna Circle in 1930–31. Gödel, for instance, is recorded in the
minutes as raising it very simply and bluntly on one occasion:
Gödel asked how the discussion about logical questions could be justified, as it
involves the utterance not of any meaningful sentences but only of elucidations
[Erläuterungen]. This raises the question how admissable elucidations are to be
demarcated from metaphysical pseudo-sentences. (ASP/RC 081-07-11; Stadler,
1997, p. 288)
This brings down to bare bones a central question facing the Vienna Circle during
this period: What protected its critique of traditional philosophy from itself? Is e.g.
the verification principle itself verifiable? Is any theoretical statement about language
(even the language of science) verifiable? And if not, why is their status not every bit
as metaphysical as that of the philosophies the Vienna Circle was consigning to the
dustbin?8
Wittgenstein himself had of course confronted this problem head on, taking the
heroic (if somewhat obscure) position that his own statements were, in the light of
7 There has been considerable speculation (Floyd 2002, Geach, 1983; Soames, 1983; Sundholm, 1992)
how Wittgenstein intended his operator N to make quantification “truth-functional” without resort-
ing to a “molecular” finitism of the kind discerned in the Tractatus by the Vienna Circle, and most
interpreters now think this is how Wittgenstein should be understood. However, the Circle clearly
did not understand him this way, as Carnap retrospectively makes explicit in Testability and Meaning
(Carnap, 1936–7, §23); in the Tractatus, Carnap’s prime example there of a “molecular language”,
he states unequivocally that “truth-operations. . . are conceived as not including general operators
[i.e. quantifiers]” (ibid., p. 18). And in his conversations with the Circle, Wittgenstein said nothing
to contradict this interpretation (Waismann, 1967, e.g. p. 188). Moreover, Carnap says that “I too
accepted a molecular language. According to the positivistic principle of testability in its most radical
form, I restricted the atomic sentences to sentences about actual experiences. . .” (ibid., p. 19)—as
indeed Wittgenstein himself seems to have done at least sometimes during this period; in a conversa-
tion of 1930–31 he says that “object” in the Tractatus is “used for such things as a colour, a point in
visual space, etc” Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 120). If a scientific theory is a truth function of observation
sentences, then it can only be a statement about a finite number of instances, not a universal law.
This was why the picture theory, combined with the Circle’s empiricism, made theoretical science as
ordinarily conceived impossible.
8 Despite the Circle’s (and especially Carnap’s) intense preoccupation with this question in 1930–
31, it soon emerged as an all-purpose, unanswerable one-line refutation of logical empiricism.
We still find it used this way, e.g. by Hilary Putnam: “An obvious rejoinder [to the verification
principle] was to say that the logical positivist criterion of significance was self-refuting: for the cri-
terion itself is neither (a) ‘analytic’. . . nor (b) empirically testable. Strangely enough this criticism
had very little impact on the logical positivists. . . I believe that the neglect of this particular philo-
sophical gambit was a great mistake; that the gambit is not only correct, but contains a deep lesson.”
(Putnam, 1981, p. 106)
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what they themselves asserted, strictly nonsense, and that one must “kick away the
ladder” once things were seen correctly. This subtle and profound view is developed
from a distinction between “saying” and “showing” arrived at from the impossibility
of referring to the structure of language itself, in the 4.12’s of the Tractatus, and then
applied with full force in the final sentences of the book.
But these two problematic consequences of the Tractatus were unacceptable to
the Vienna Circle. To begin with, they conflicted with the Circle’s central project
of rational reconstruction. If much of existing theoretical science fails to qualify as
meaningful, and discourse about language is excluded in any case, then it becomes
impossible even to compare different expressions regarding their precision or their
usefulness for some practical purpose. It becomes impossible to say, for instance, that
a rationally reconstructed concept ismore precise, ormore useful, than the concept to
be reconstructed. This obstructs the Vienna Circle’s practical critique of metaphysics
and unclear thinking, and undermines its entire Enlightenment project. On a more
basic level, the sublime character of Wittgenstein’s position (to the extent it was even
recognized by the Vienna Circle) was fundamentally opposed to their Machean sci-
entific and positivistic temper. That the basic principles of a theory should have their
own meaninglessness as a consequence could only be regarded as a new and refined
form of reductio ad absurdum.
Though the Circle discussed these two problems (the scope of the scientific
language, the status of the theory itself) in Wittgensteinian terms, they approached
themwith their own agendas firmly inmind.Carnap had himself, in hisAufbau (largely
written before his 1926 arrival in Vienna, when he wasmost intensely exposed toWitt-
genstein’s influence), arrived independently at a similar impasse to Wittgenstein’s.9
He had found himself caught between his basic requirement that all knowledge be
“structural” and the need to give empirical or phenomenological validation to in-
stances of the one remaining basic relation.10 In attempting to overcome this problem
by eliminating the basic relation, he encountered perplexities of the representation
relation analogous to thoseWittgenstein had highlighted with the distinction between
“saying” and “showing”. But Carnap thought that although Wittgenstein had raised
a very interesting and important question, he had not fully captured the problems
underlying it, and that a more satisfactory articulation of the problem would make
the issue clearer and more precise than Wittgenstein had.11
9 From the first conception of the Aufbau in the early 1920s, Carnap’s conception of “structural”
had grown steadily narrower, but it had not quite, by 1926, reached the completely non-epistemo-
logical view Wittgenstein had put forward. “The Tractatus,” in the words of Michael Dummett, “is
a pure essay in the theory of meaning, from which every trace of epistemological or psychological
consideration has been purged as thoroughly as the house is purged of leaven before the Passover.”
(Dummett, 1981, p. 679) In fact it is unlikely that Carnap, with his eye firmly on the task of reconstruct-
ing knowledge, would ever have adopted such a standpoint. So it is unlikely that he would have solved
the problem of the status of logic (and, for him, mathematics) without Wittgenstein’s aid; this is why
he (and Hahn; see above) acknowledged their debt to Wittgenstein, and adopted Wittgenstein’s
terminology.
10 This tension is explicitly acknowledged in §153 of theAufbau, where Carnap admits that the basic
relation on which the entire system has been based is still non-logical, and that this is inconsistent
with his principle, stated in §15–16, that “all scientific statements are purely structural statements.”
The solution offered in §154–155 is explicitly tentative and problematic.
11 In the Syntax he thought he had attained this higher degree of clarity and precision. It is no acci-
dent, we think, that so many sentences from the Tractatus are among the “pseudo-object” sentences
listed in the two-column passages in §§78–80 of the Syntax.
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The further question how the actual “picturing” relation between facts and
sentences is to enter into the constitution of knowledge was one that, as far as Carnap
was concerned,Wittgenstein had not even addressed; theTractatus is extremely vague
on the precise nature of its “atomic sentences”. Carnap thought he had made some
progress here by proposing a definite form, though he was open to the idea that the
atomic sentences could take forms other than those proposed in the Aufbau.12 He
was aware, though, that the system of theAufbau had left significant gaps and needed
further work, especially in the “constitution of the non-given”.13 Hans Reichenbach
and Eino Kaila14 had taken exception, for instance, to the apparent exclusion from
the constitution system of certain modes of inference required in actual science, such
as empirical induction, probability, and statistical inference.
An even more fundamental problem for the entire logicist procedure by which
Carnap had constructed the Aufbau was raised by axiomatic systems. The explicit
definitions in which he had (nominally, at least) attempted to construct the whole of
knowledge could not accommodate the “implicit definitions” of concepts in axiomatic
systems that Schlick had described in his Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, and Einstein
in his lecture Geometry and Experience. This problem Carnap had addressed in a
large-scale project to reconcile axiomatic definitions with logicism, and transform
implicit into explicit definitions. The result was a large, unfinished manuscript enti-
tled Investigations in General Axiomatics. The central theorem of the first part of
this manuscript proves that an axiom system is categorical if and only if it is complete
[Entscheidungsdefinit]. Thus in particular, arithmetic is complete, as the Peano axioms
are categorical.15
One important feature of the system described in the Axiomatics was that axiom-
atic systems are not purely syntactic, but are given a fixed range of interpretions within
a basic system, aGrunddisziplin, as Carnap called it, of arithmetic and set theory. This
made it possible to regard axiomatic systems as having content, as long as it could be
shown that the sentences of the Grunddisziplin itself had definite meanings. So not
only is every sentence in the language of arithmetic decidable under this view, but it
has a definite meaning as well, since it is interpreted in the Grunddisziplin.
Within his Axiomatics manuscript, though, there is no attempt to explain how
the Grunddisziplin acquires its fixed interpretation. This task Carnap attempted in a
loose sketch he wrote down in Davos in April 1929, when he was attending the “Eu-
ropäische Hochschultage” where Heidegger and Cassirer debated the legacy of Kant
(Friedman, 2000). The sketch was headed, ambitiously, “New Foundation for Logic”
12 In his review of Kaila’s critique of the Aufbau (Kaila 1930; see note 14 below) Carnap says that
“today we do not yet know what form and content the atomic sentences will [ultimately] have”, and
he allows that the form given in the Aufbau may have to be changed (Carnap, 1931, p. 77).
13 This included, for Carnap, not only the constitution of the specific modes of inference mentioned
in the following sentence above, but also of the constitution of the framework of constitution itself;
see the discussion below on the “New Foundation of Logic”.
14 Kaila’s critique (1930) was the first book-length assessment of the Vienna Circle; it focussed its
criticisms almost exclusively on Carnap’s Aufbau. It frequently invokes Reichenbach (1929), which
argues (pp. 26ff.) in favor of realism and against positivism, though not explicitly against Carnap.
15 This project is discussed in Awodey and Carus (2001), which also gives a more detailed account of
the importance of the Gabelbarkeitssatz for Carnap’s Aufbau project as well as the Vienna Circle’s
entire philosophy of logic and mathematics. Carnap’s proof of the Gabelbarkeitssatz is actually cor-
rect, in his own terms, despite appearances. It does not, however, actually capture what he intended,
as discussed in detail in the above paper, and as Carnap himself realized in 1930, even before Gödel’s
incompleteness results later that year.
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[Neue Grundlegung der Logik].16 Its main idea is to erect a Hilbertian axiomatic
superstructure on a Wittgensteinian basis. The atomic sentences are pictures of ele-
mentary facts, as in the Tractatus. But other signs, not given a definite meaning in
advance, may also be added and treated just like atomic sentences, as may “infer-
ence rules” governing the transformation of given sentence forms into other sentence
forms. All sentences containing the meaningless signs still have a definite meaning,
Carnap argues, as they confine the total space of possibilities to certain rows of
the truth-table of a complete truth-functional state-description of the world (of the
kind envisaged by Wittgenstein). The only requirement of a “logic” so constructed—
evidently intended as a preliminary sketch for building a Grunddisziplin17—is that it
not allow inference to any atomic sentence that is not already among the premisses.
Axiom systems may then be framed within such a “logic”, and all theorems resulting
from them can likewise be assigned a definite meaning because they constrain the
truth-table of the complete state-description of the world.18 This is the case even if
they contain signs for infinite sets. These, Carnap says, are licensed within his system,
though not purely “formalistically” as in Hilbert; they have a definite meaning, even
if not a complete one:
If now, to introduce the infinite, one “adjoins ideal propositions” (Hilbert), i.e.
writes down formulas that have no contentful [inhaltliche] meaning, but per-
mit us to derive the mathematics of the infinite, then we have once again been
able to determine the meaning of the signs introduced as meaningless, by inves-
tigating for which logical constants the formulas would become tautologies.
(ULCA/RC1029/Box 4/CM13, item 2, p. 62)
Unlike Hilbert, Carnap does not regard axiomatic systems as strings of purely for-
mal, uninterpreted signs. Despite this, he calls his idea “radical formalism” because
it allows not only logical inferences, but any sort of scientific inference—including,
relevantly, inductive inference in empirical science, or statistical inference—to be
employed as part of a “system of logic” in this way. All these inferences are now at
the same level. In a talk at Reichenbach’s seminar in late 1929, Carnap said that all
such inferences could be assimilated to truth-functional inference like that described
by Wittgenstein. We can regard any mode of inference, whether in mathematics or in
empirical science, he said, formalistically—as a rule for transforming sentences of a
certain specified form into sentences of a different form. We can even take axiomatic
systems of infinitary mathematics and theoretical physics in this way.19 In a lecture
in Warsaw of December 1930, he said, along these same lines, that there is only one
rule of inference in science: We can transform a sentence however we like, but the
16 This document is in Carnap’s papers at the Archive of Scientific Philosophy, Hillman Library,
University of Pittsburgh (henceforth abbreviated ASP/RC), catalogue mark 089-64-01.
17 Though there is no explicit provision for the quantifiers, Carnap may have intended to develop
them axiomatically, as Hilbert and Ackermann (1928, pp. 22–23 and 53–54) had for both the prop-
ositional and the predicate calculus. The terminology of the “New Foundation” coincides with
Hilbert and Ackermann, where the quantifiers are introduced by “formal axioms”, which are dis-
tinguished from the “inhaltliche” (material, contentful) rules of inference—the terms also used by
Carnap.
18 This idea, too, seems to have been suggested by the Tractatus, which says “The truth or falsehood
of every single sentence changes something in the general construction of the world. And the range
[Spielraum] that is left its construction by the totality of atomic sentences is precisely that which the
most general sentences delimit.” (5.5262)
19 Carnap’s shorthand notes for this talk are preserved inUCLA/RC1029/Box 4/folder CM13, item 3.
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conclusion is to have nomore content than the premisses; it is to constrain the range of
possibly true atomic sentences no less than the premisses; i.e. no new atomic sentences
are recognized as true. All laws of logic, as well as all rules of inference in science, he
maintains, follow from this principle (ASP/RC 110-07-35, p. 2).
Though this idea is not thought through, and is inmanyways incomplete, it indicates
how Carnap was attempting to extend a truth-functional Wittgensteinian language to
one usable for mathematics and science, though the kind of solution Carnap was
considering saw for mathematics very much the role that Wittgenstein had envisaged
for it in the Tractatus:
The sentence of mathematics expresses no thought. In life it is never the math-
ematical sentence we need. We use the mathematical sentence only to derive
sentences that do not belong to mathematics from other sentences that also do
not belong to mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1922, 6.21–6.211)
In the course of 1930, however, this somewhat shaky “New Foundation for Logic”
collapsed. Three developments contributed to undermine it. First, the Gabelbarke-
itssatz fell victim to Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. As Gödel indicated in
the discussion following the famous symposium on the philosophy of mathematics
in Königsberg in September 1930 (at which Carnap had been the spokesperson for
logicism, Heyting for intuitionism, and von Neumann for formalism), there could be
true arithmetic sentences that were not provable:
One can even (given the consistency of classical mathematics) give examples
of sentences (of the kind stated by Goldbach or Fermat) that are correct in
their content, but not provable in the formal system of classical mathematics. By
adding the negation of such a sentence to the axioms of classical mathematics,
one obtains a consistent system in which a sentence whose content is false is
provable. (Gödel, 1931b, p. 202)
Second, the incompleness result had an even more fundamentally devastating effect
on logicism itself, which the Vienna Circle had relied on to guarantee the tautological
(and thus empty) character of mathematics. The Circle had needed all reasoning,
mathematical or not, to have this character so as to undermine the metaphysical idea
that conclusions about the real world could be reached by reasoning alone, without
factual knowledge (Carnap, 1930, p. 25). But now it turned out that there could be
sentences of arithmetic that were not decidable after all. The logicist explicit defini-
tion of the numbers had failed to guarantee the tautological character of arithmetic
reasoning.
Third and finally, we return to Gödel’s question. The apparent incompatibility
of meta-linguistic discourse with Wittgenstein’s framework was, as we saw, a funda-
mental barrier to the Vienna Circle’s larger goals, and they sought to overcome it.
The new work in mathematical logic, especially by Hilbert, Gödel, and Tarski, made
essential use of the distinction between a language and its meta-language. This work
appeared to be rigorous, indeed more rigorous than older logical work like Russell’s.
It thus seemed to represent a clear counterexample to what the Vienna Circle read
into Wittgenstein’s final sentences. Still, there was the difficulty that “elucidations”,
meta-linguistic sentences of the kind Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle themselves
had used in their writings, seemed impossible to put in the kind of mathematical form
that Gödel and Tarski were using.
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2 The sleepless night and the original syntax idea
This threefold crisis brings us to Carnap’s sleepless night. We are now in a position to
understand the significance of theVersuch einerMetalogik he wrote the following day.
What we find is a perspective that is radically different from the Wittgensteinian one
of the “New Foundation”. Carnap has here adopted the fully formal, “metalogical”
point of view of Gödel and Tarski, according to which the logical language is a system
of uninterpreted marks rather than meaningful signs. In the perspective of the “New
Foundation”, the atomic sentences were pictures of atomic facts, which gave them
their meaning. In the Versuch, an atomic sentence is a finite sequence of superscript
dots, followed by the letter “f” with a finite sequence of subscript dots, followed by
a left parenthesis, followed by the letter “a” with a finite sequence of subscript dots,
followed by a right parenthesis, e.g.:
......f....(a...)
An atomic sentence was thus a certain finite string consisting of instances of finitely
many basic marks [Zeichen]—the instances themselves being physical marks, having
a particular location on the blackboard or on a page. These physical marks represent
the Zeichen of the calculus just as a geometrical diagram represents relations in pure,
uninterpreted mathematical geometry.
In the “New Foundation”, a sentence is a tautology because of what it says, or not,
about the world. In the Versuch, being a tautology is a property of a string of marks
that is defined entirely in terms of its outer form—the type and order of the marks
occuring in it. No use is made of the “meaning”, “designation”, etc. of the marks
[Zeichen] in defining the central notions of truth-value assignment, consequence, tau-
tology, and the like. Carnap even mentions that the undefined notion “true” might be
better to avoid entirely.20
From the viewpoint of modern logic, this idea may not seem particularly momen-
tous. Even at the time, it represented no technical innovation; Hilbert and others
had been treating axiomatic systems formally for decades, and the methods of Gödel
and Tarski did essentially that. But though Carnap’s first attempt to formulate his
“metalogic” was in terms of a particular formal system, his aim was not merely the
mathematical study of a given formal logical system. His new idea was precisely to
apply the insights of Hilbert, Gödel, and Tarski to the entirety of knowledge. As we
saw above, he had previously acceptedWittgenstein’s basic account of the logical lan-
guage framework in which all science was to be expressed, as the basis for the project
of rational reconstruction. In that context the “metalogical” perspective of regarding
language purely as a system of rules, without reference to anything outside itself, was
indeed a revolutionary idea.
Before Wittgenstein, language had been regarded as an essentially transparent
medium for the expression of thought. The laws of logic were considered by Frege
and Russell to be laws of thought, judgement, or perhaps nature—but certainly not
of language. Wittgenstein had recognized that they were laws of language. But he had
arrived at this idea via a theory of representation that forced language to conform
always and everywhere to a particular system of rules, arising necessarily from the
20 In the margin of p. 3 of the manuscript, Carnap has scrawled, “Regarding the undefined concept
‘true’. It is completely different from the other concepts of metalogic. Perhaps avoidable? [Perhaps]
just define which atomic sentences are the “basis” of a sentence, and how. (?)”
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representational function of language—the picture theory. The possibility of represen-
tation determined a particular formof linguistic intuition, so to speak. This elementary
logic built into our form of representation was, like a Kantian form of intuition, an
inescapable straight-jacket. The very nature of language, in Wittgenstein’s view (at
least as seen by the Vienna Circle), prevented us from stepping outside it. One could
call this quasi-Kantian view “Wittgenstein’s prison”.
Under the suggestive influence of Hilbert’s formal approach to axiomatic systems
and its use byGödel and Tarski, Carnap was able to escape fromWittgenstein’s prison
by taking Wittgenstein’s own idea of language as a system of rules one step further.
Carnap distinguished the representational or meaning function of language from its
purely combinatorial one, and now took the latter, rather than the former, as his start-
ing point. The metalogical methods developed in pursuit of the very mathematical
results (such as the incompleteness theorem) that had led to the disintegration of
his Wittgenstein-based position in the “New Foundation”, it turned out, also showed
a way of breaking out of Wittgenstein’s prison, and making the structure of lan-
guage itself the object of logical study. As opposed to the confinement of all possible
knowledge within the absolute constraints imposed by a (naturally or metaphysically)
fixed structure of our means of expression, this new recognition that linguistic struc-
ture could itself be investigated opened up a whole new method for the unification
and clarification of knowledge. Thus Carnap retainedWittgenstein’s language-depen-
dence of knowledge, but threw off the shackles of Wittgenstein’s prison in favor of
the logicians’ metalogical perspective.
Armed with this new insight then, and in the rush of enthusiasm that accompanied
it, Carnap apparently hoped to be able to solve the other problems that had under-
mined the “New Foundation”, particularly those afflicting logicism. Arithmetic, it was
envisaged in the Versuch, could evidently somehow be read off from the syntax of the
logical object language—as opposed to being expressed in that language.21 Thus the
numbers are not defined as higher-order concepts in the Frege-Russell logicist style,
but “purely as figures” [rein figurell], on the basis of the dot sequences attached to the
symbols. Arithmetical properties and statements then belong to the meta-language.
Thus e.g. the commutativity of addition n + m = m + n was supposed to follow from
the fact that n-many dots written to the left of m-many dots gives the same series
of dots as writing them to the right of m-many dots. The question of the need for
mathematical induction in the meta-language is considered, but dismissed with some
optimism.
If arithmetic was to be formulated in the meta-language of logic, then analysis
was to be formulated in its meta-meta-language. For real numbers are properties or
series of natural numbers, and properties of them and statements about them prop-
erly belong one level up. Carnap may have been guided, in this idea, by Russell’s
suggestion, in his introduction to the Tractatus, that one could perhaps break out of
Wittgenstein’s prison by using a scheme involving a hierarchy of languages:
These difficulties suggest to my mind some such possibility as this: that every
language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in the
language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language deal-
ing with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure,
21 An addition of 7 February 1931 to themanuscript says, “the syntax of the rows of dots is arithmetic”
(p. 1).
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and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit. (Russell, 1922,
p. 286)
Having now found the mechanism for such a scheme in the form of “metalogic”,
applying it to achieve a hierarchy consisting of language, meta-language, meta-meta-
language, and so on22 must have indeed seemed rather compelling, at first sight.
Carnap says in his autobiographical account that not only “the whole theory of
language structure” came to him like a vision, but also “its possible applications in
philosophy”.23 These were spelled out later that year in the paper “Die physikali-
sche Sprache als Universalsprache der Wissenschaft”, which was later published in
English, with a new preface, as the pamphlet Unity of Science. This paper is mainly
known for its advocacy of physicalism, and is thus taken to represent a watershed in
Carnap’s epistemological views from the phenomenalism of theAufbau to a Neurath-
inspired physicalism. This epistemological aspect is certainly present in the paper,
and reflected in its title. But the new syntactical doctrine is equally in evidence and,
indeed, motivates the paper’s physicalistic conclusions. After three pages of introduc-
tory discussion about the idea that all objects and facts are of a single kind, we are told
that these expressions are a concession to the customary “material” [inhaltliche] way
of speaking. The “correct” way, Carnap says, speaks of words rather than “objects”
and sentences rather than “facts”, for a philosophical investigation is an analysis of
language. In a footnote he indicates that a comprehensive, strictly formal theory of
language forms, which he calls “metalogic”, will soon be forthcoming, and will justify
the “thesis of metalogic” here invoked, that “meaningful” [sinnvolle] philosophical
sentences are the metalogical ones, i.e. those that speak only of the form of language
(Carnap, 1932a, p. 435).
This represents a radically different basis for the critique of metaphysics from the
oneCarnaphadpreviously adopted fromWittgenstein,wherebymeaningful sentences
were those that derived their meaning from atomic sentences by truth-functional
combinations. Atomic sentences, as pictures of atomic facts, no longer play any role
in distinguishing meaningful from meaningless sentences. The new metalogical or
syntactic viewpoint is significant, as Eino Kaila agreed after discussion with Carnap a
few months later, because of its “elimination of verification by comparison with facts
[Ausschaltung der Verifikation durch Vergleich mit Sachverhalten]” (ASP/RC [diary
entry of 26 June 1931]). As Carnap explained in “Die physikalische Sprache,” not only
criterial definitions but also ostensive definitions can be regarded as intra-linguistic.24
22 TheVersuch ends with a summary in four points: “(1) The particular natural numbers occur as signs
of the language itself. (2) The so-called “properties of natural numbers” are not proper properties, but
syntactic (Wittgenstein: internal) ones, so are to be expressed in themetalanguage. (3)Aparticular real
number is a property or sequence of natural numbers, so is also to be expressed in the metalanguage.
(4) The properties of real numbers are not real properties, but syntactic properties (with respect to the
syntax of the metalanguage), and thus to be expressed in the meta-metalanguage.” (p. 44)
23 In the Vienna Circle, he says, “the philosophical problems in which we were interested ended up
with problems of the logical analysis of language,” and since “in our view the issue in philosophical
problems concerned the language, not the world”, the Circle thought that “these problems should be
formulated not in the object language but in the metalanguage.” It was therefore “the chief motivation
for my development of the syntactical method,” (our emphasis) to develop a “suitable metalanguage”
that would”essentially contribute toward greater clarity in the formulation of philosophical problems
and greater fruitfulness in their discussions.” (Carnap, 1963, p. 55)
24 “Elephant”, for instance, criterially defined as an animal with certain characteristics, might be
ostensively defined as “an animal of the kind present at a certain space-time location” (Carnap,
1932a, p. 435–436).
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So Carnap had comprehensively and definitively turned his back on the picture
theory of the Tractatus—and thus also on its foundationalism. Meaning was no
longer built up from some basic (naturally occurring or metaphysically unavoidable)
components. Wittgenstein’s idea of language as exhaustively characterizable by rules
was taken a step further. The rules were no longer to be found, they were no longer
objectively determinate and discoverable artifacts of the nature of representation,
as Wittgenstein had appeared to suggest. Instead, they were a matter of human
decision, conventions by which we set up the language of science. The upshot of
Carnap’s dream, then, was a liberation from the manacles of a fixed structure im-
posed on the human mind by natural or metaphysical factors beyond human control.
January 1931 was the turning point in Carnap’s career where the voluntarism to which
he had already tended previously (Jeffrey, 1994) could finally find its proper scope
and expression. With respect to Wittgenstein’s prison, this was literally an overnight
transformation from slave to master. But for Carnap, the logical and philosophi-
cal aspects were closely entwined, and obstacles remained to be overcome on the
logical front.
3 Metalogik : the first draft of Logical Syntax
The view that the terms “analytic” and “contradictory” are purely formal and
that analytic sentences are empty of content was stated by Weyl. . . Later, Witt-
genstein made the same view the basis of his whole philosophy. “It is the char-
acteristic mark of logical sentences that one can perceive from the symbol alone
that they are true; and this fact contains in itself thewhole philosophyof logic.”. . .
“And so also it is one of the most important facts that the truth or falshood
of non-logical sentences can not be recognized from the sentences alone.” This
statement, which gives expression toWittgenstein’s absolutist conception of lan-
guage and leaves out the conventional factor in the construction of a language,
misses the mark. (Carnap, 1934, p. 139)
In rejecting Wittgenstein’s absolutism in favor of the logicians’ conception of meta-
logic, the problem of elucidations was solved, but the excited solution to the problems
of logicism suggested by the new metalogical standpoint turned out not to work. The
rather odd idea that arithmetic could be read off from the meta-language of logic
in a sense turned out to be too correct, in that some essential meta-logical concepts
(notably provablity) required for their formulation a combinatorial theory that was
every bit as complicated as arithmetic itself. Thus in the late spring of 1931, Carnap
decided to move to a conventional axiomatic arithmetic in the object language, so that
the axiomatized arithmetic could then be used to express the metalanguage, using
Gödel’s method of arithmetization (ibid., §19). This move had the further advantage
of collapsing the entire hierarchy of languages and meta-languages into itself, at least
in principle, by iterating Gödel’s method of arithmetizing the metalanguage in the
object language. Thus it appeared (for a time at least) that one could now get by with
only a single language after all.25
25 The first systematic exposition of the new view was in a series of three lectures to the Vienna
Circle in June and July of 1931. These fell into the period during which Rose Rand was taking minutes
of the Circle meetings, so they are recorded, somewhat elliptically, in ASP/RC 081-07-17, 18, and 19
(with further discussion of these lectures in 081-07-20), and published in Stadler (1997, pp. 314–334).
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However well this seemed to work, there was a price to be paid for it. For the very
thing that had made the “metalogical” solution possible—i.e. the precise definablity
of the central metalogical notions and their expressibility in the object language—was
also responsible for the essential incompleteness of the logical treatment of mathe-
matics. The identification of the logical with the formal seemed to restrict its scope to
only what can be expressed with very limited means. If, however, there were no intrin-
sic constraints on the sorts of formal properties of formulas that could be considered,
then perhaps there could be a formal criterion for mathematical truth different from
mere provability. SinceGödel had shown that provability was insufficient—therewere
“true” arithmetical statements not derivable from the axioms—the identification of
such a criterion was essential. Carnap seems to have developed such a criterion some-
time in the latter part of 1931, in the form of the notion of analyticity. This was to be
a stronger sort of logical truth than provability in a formal system, but was still to be
determined strictly in terms of the formal character of the symbols.
Analyticity was apparently to take the place of provability as the generalized
notion of tautology or logical truth. To understand how this was intended, consider
the analogy of a chess game. Think of the starting position of the pieces as the axioms,
the permitted moves as the rules of inference, and a sequence of moves ending in
checkmate as a proof of a theorem. But now observe that there are configurations of
pieces on the board that constitute checkmate, but cannot be reached from the start-
ing position by any sequence of permitted rules.26 Such a configuration represents an
analytic sentence that has no proof. In this way, the definition of analytic sentence can
be phrased entirely formally, in accordance with all the same rules of inference, and
yet still be wider than provability. Thus the absolute, Wittgensteinian conception of
tautology could be saved, and indeed finally extended beyond propositional logic in
accordance with the Vienna Circle’s original ambitions.
Such a notion of analyticity was apparently defined in the first draft of the
Logical Syntax, entitledMetalogik, of which nothing has been preserved (as far as we
have been able to determine) but its table of contents. This lists the notion analytic
alongside synthetic and contradictory under the heading “IV.B. Theory of content of
formulas” (corresponding roughly to IV.B(a) of Logical Syntax, which—in the Eng-
lish translation—gives the general definition of “analytic”). This is followed in section
IV.C by a discussion of soundness, consistency, and completeness, including sections
on the “antinomies” and “the incompleteness of all formal systems” which appear
to correspond closely to IV.B(c) of the (English) Logical Syntax, where the Gödel
incompleteness of arithmetic is discussed.
Footnote 25 continued
Carnap appears, from evidence in the file containing the Versuch, to have changed the system to an
arithmetized one on 17 June, the day before the second lecture. He spells out the difference this makes
to the scope of the system at the conclusion of the second lecture as follows: “The difference between
arithmetic metalogic and the metalogic portrayed previously is this: arithmetic metalogic treats not
the empirically available, but all possible configurations. Our previous metalogic is the descriptive
theory of certain given configurations, it is the geography of language forms, while the arithmetized
metalogic is the geometry of language forms.” (Stadler, 1997, p. 325) Also noteworthy in these talks
is the fact that they contain no definition of analyticity, and that they take the view that only a single
language is required (something like the later Language I). In answer to the question “So are we to
draw the inference that there is only a single language?”, Carnap replies “Well, there are sentences
of very different form …, but all of them, even the metalogical ones, are in a single language.” (ibid.,
p. 329).
26 For instance: all the black pawns in their starting positions and the row behind them empty except
for black king in one corner, white rook in the other.
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Wedon’t knowexactly howanalyticitywas originally defined, but from the evidence
available it is clear that the definition was defective. As we shall explain presently in
more detail, Gödel objected to its application to the “extended model language”.27
And furthermore, he points out, it will be impossible to give a correct definition of
it in any meta-language that can be faithfully represented in the object language,
e.g. by arithmetization. This fact has since become known as Tarski’s theorem on the
indefinability of truth. Thus it turns out that Carnap’s single language approach will
not work after all.
Gödel’s objection to Carnap’s original definition of analyticity is explained in a
letter dated 11 September 1932 (Gödel, 2003, pp. 346–348). Carnap had apparently
tried to define the notion “analytic sentence” inductively, using what we would now
call a substitutional treatment of quantification. Thus e.g. given an arithmetical sen-
tence of the form (∀x)f (x), with quantification over the numerical variable x and f (x)
a formula with at most x free, one could reasonably define:
(∀x)f (x)is analytic ⇔df f (a)is analytic for all numerical constants a
In his definition, Carnap had apparently tried to use the same strategy for higher-order
quantifiers, for example over all properties or sets, as in (∀X)f (X). Thus e.g. for f (X)
of the simple form X(0) one would have:
(∀X)X(0)is analytic ⇔df A(0)is analytic for all predicate constants A(x)
But here there is no restriction on what predicate constants (i.e. “open sentences”)
A(x) are to be substituted for X in testing for analyticity, so among the substitution
instances is e.g. the predicate (∀X)X(x) itself. Thus the definition is circular, and so it
does not succeed in specifying the desired notion. The problem here is in the so-called
impredicativity of the higher-order quantifier. One could restrict the substitutions to
predicates of lower “order”, in a suitably defined sense, and this would result in a
workable scheme, but it would only provide a definition for a system like ramified
type theory, which is inadequate for classical mathematics.
In his letter, Gödel suggests instead using a notion of “all sets and relations what-
ever” [alle Mengen und Relationen überhaupt] in place of “all predicates”. An inter-
esting footnote indicates that this need not be interpreted as Platonism, as he only
suggests formulating the definition of “analytic” in a particular metalanguage, in
which the concepts of “set” and “relation” are already given. He goes on to say that he
intends to use this idea to give a truth definition in Part II of his paper (presumably the
missing sequel to Gödel, 1931a). And, moreover, that he believes it can not be done
otherwise, and that the higher functional calculus cannot be treated “semantically”
(i.e. according to Carnap’s strictly formal conception of metalogic).
In his first reply, a desperate Carnap attempts to reconstruct Gödel’s proposal—the
difficulty lies in the idea of “all values” for a predicate of the object language L. How
27 From the table of contents (ASP/RC 110-04-07) it seems clear that a single language (corre-
sponding to the later language I) was developed as the “model language” [Modellsprache]. (In “Die
physikalische Sprache”, it had been called the “system language” [Systemsprache].) Just as in the June
1931 lectures to the Vienna Circle (see above, footnote 17) held just before Carnap embarked on
composing the first draft, it seems that the “model language” was regarded as the “proper language”
[eigentliche Sprache], while the full resources of classical mathematics could be developed by using the
“model language” as ameta-language for axiomatic formal systems, Hilbert-style; themodel language
together with these axiomatic extensions was then called the “extended model language”.
38 Synthese (2007) 159:23–45
is this to be understood, even with respect to another language L′ in which the values
are to be taken? It will not suffice to use only the predicates definable in L′; one
apparently needs instead all “arbitrary” ones. And this latter notion strikes him as
rather questionable [ziemlich bedenklich]. He finally asks for help in finding the right
definition, especially since, as he says, everything else in his book depends on it (ibid.,
pp. 350–352).
Judging from his note of a few days later, Carnap finally did work out the solution
for himself. He realized that the notion of “all values” of a predicate could be rendered
in the formal meta-language L′ simply by using a universal quantifier (∀X) . . .X. . . .
The key new idea here is that the language L′ in which the values are taken needs to
be stronger than the one for which they are given (ibid., p. 354). In his (delayed) reply,
Gödel confirms that this is the idea, and remarks that one cannot give the definition
of “analytic” in the same language, otherwise “contradictions will result”. He also
points out that, presumably in the meantime, Tarski has already published a “similar”
definition of “analytic”,28 which seems likely to be the reason Gödel never worked
out his own part II (ibid., p. 356).
For Carnap, ultimately, the resulting definition of “analytic”—which had previ-
ously been so crucial—was not even deemed important enough to include in the first
edition of the book; it was omitted “for reasons of space”.29 The problem with it was
that, as hinted by Gödel in the footnote about Platonism, the notion of analyticity it
defined was not absolute, but rather in a certain sense, conventional. It gave a notion
of “analytic in L”, but only with respect to another language L′, used for the inter-
pretation of L. There might be a natural or conventional choice for L′—type theory
of the next higher type, or axiomatic set theory—but it could hardly be claimed that
any particular such choice is the correct notion of analytic for a given language.30 This
language relativity of the central notions of metalogic turned out to bemore important
to Carnap than the particular metalogical definitions themselves. And this brings us
to the final step in the story we have been telling.
28 Presumably he refers here to Tarski (1932), which however gives only a bare summary; Gödel may
have known more details from Tarski directly.
29 In a recent paper it is claimed that “Carnap’s main task in Syntax was to provide a reconstruction
of mathematical truth” (Lavers, 2004, p. 296; cf also p. 308). This was true, as we have seen, of the
first draft (theMetalogik)—but no longer of the published book. Note that the passages discussed by
Lavers in support of his claim (ibid., pp. 297–299) were not included in the book’s original edition
(1934).
30 Despite their view that the “logical syntax” (in Wittgenstein’s sense) of the language was partly a
matter of convention, the Vienna Circle up to this point generally held that there were “correct” and
“incorrect” languages. In Carnap’s case this is explicit in his papers during this period (1932a,b; see
above, p. [16]) as well as retrospective comments soon after (“Iwaswrong in thinking that the language
I dealt with was the language, i.e. the only legitimate language. . . Consequently I made the mistake of
formulating my epistemological view in the form of an assertion—as most philosophers do—instead
of in the form of a suggestion concerning the form of language.” (1936–7, p. 20) We suggest that this
conviction was shaken above all by Carnap’s realization at this point that, if the meta-language was
not part of the the same language, then there was no inherently privileged meta-language that could
obviously or “naturally” claim to be “correct”. Quine (1963) section VII thinks that Carnap’s move to
semantics was largely driven by this situation; as argued in the next section, we believe that Carnap’s
response to it was more fundamental.
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4 Tolerance
The first public signal that Carnap’s thought had entered yet another radically new
phase was the discussion contribution “Über Protokollsätze”, a response to Neurath’s
paper (entitled “Protokollsätze”) that had in turn responded to Carnap’s “Die phys-
ikalische Sprache”. This discussion contribution was written within a month or two
after the above correspondence with Gödel, and Carnap is a changed man. A new
tone has suddenly entered his writing, one he would stick with from then on, and that
would become deeply characteristic: “In my view the issue here is not between two
conceptions that contradict each other, but rather between two methods for construct-
ing the language of science, which are both possible and justified.” (Carnap, 1932b,
p. 215) And he spells out the grounds of this new pluralism:
Not only the question whether the protocol sentences are inside or outside the
syntax language, but also the further question regarding their precise specifica-
tion, is to be answered, it seems to me, not by an assertion, but by a stipulation
[Festseztung]. Though I earlier [in “Die physikalische Sprache”] left this question
open . . . I now think that the different answers are not contradictory. They are
to be taken as proposals for stipulations [Vorschläge zu Festsetzungen]; the task
is to investigate these different possible stipulations as to their consequences
and assess their usefulness. (ibid., p. 216)
To the best of our knowledge there is no record, either in Carnap’s autobiography or
in the form of a letter or note (or even a diary entry), recording the moment at which
he embarked on this new direction. But the sense of discovery and enthusiasm is
palpable in “Über Protokollsätze”; Carnap repeats the new message again and again.
And he is very much aware that it represents an even more radical departure from
his and the Vienna Circle’s previous position:
In all theories of knowledge to date there is a certain absolutism: in the realistic
theories an absolutism of objects, in the idealistic ones (including phenomenol-
ogy) an absolutism of the “given”, of “experiences”, of “immediate phenomena
[unmittelbare Phänomene]”. Even in positivism we find this residual idealistic
absolutism; in the logical positivism of our circle—in the works on the logic of
science (epistemology) published to date by Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap—it
takes the more subtle form of an absolutism of primitive propositions (“elemen-
tary propositions”, “atomic propositions”). (ibid., p. 228)
This sense of breakthrough is equally evident in the passages evincing the new “prin-
ciple of tolerance” in the Logical Syntax itself. The preface to that book is every bit
as messianic as the justly renowned preface to the Aufbau:
The range of possible language forms, and thus of different possible logical sys-
tems is . . . incomparably larger than the very narrow range in which modern
logical investigations have so far operated. Up to now there have only been
occasional small departures from the language form given by Russell, which has
already become classical. . .The reason for not daring to depart further from this
classical form would appear to lie in the widespread view that such departures
must be “justified”, i.e. it must be shown that the new language form is “cor-
rect”, that it represents the “true logic”. It is one of the main tasks of this book
to eliminate this view as well as the pseudoproblems and pointless squabbles
arising from it. (Carnap, 1934, p. v)
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The first attempts to escape from the “classical” forms—which themselves only went
back one or two generations!—were certainly daring, he says. “But they were hobbled
by a striving for ‘correctness’.” And Carnap concludes with the famous words: “But
now this barrier is overcome: before us lies the open sea of free possibilities.” (ibid.,
p. vi)
The principle is stated, in the text of the Logical Syntax itself, in the context not
of epistemology, as in its first application, but of philosophies of mathematics, par-
ticularly intuitionism. It is expressed as the exhortation to state meta-theoretic or
wissenschaftslogische proposals in precise terms, as explicit rules or definitions, within
the formation or transformation rules of a precisely defined language or calculus:
Once it is understood that all pro- and anti-intuitionist considerations
are concerned with the form of a calculus, the question will no longer be
asked in the form “What is the case?” but rather “How do we want to set
this up in the language being constructed?”. . . And with that, the dogmatic
frame of mind that often makes the discussion unfruitful is banished. (ibid.,
p. 42)
This “dogmatic frame of mind” results, in Carnap’s view, from the reliance on inher-
ently vague philosophical “considerations [Erörterungen]” rather than on precise
statements of definitions and rules. He indicates how he has tried, in Language I of
the Syntax, to capture the philosophical concerns (expressed in various gradations of
finitism or constructivism) voiced by Brouwer, Kaufmann, Wittgenstein, and others.
But, he points out, there is no way of telling whether he has expressed precisely what
they have in mind, as they have not expressed their views as proposed precise defi-
nitions and rules, but only in terms of vague Erörterungen that leave many specific
questions open, when one gets down to the brass tacks of constructing an actual lan-
guage (ibid., p. 44). Or they impose restrictions and requirements that appear to be
normative.
Carnap’s most general statement of the principle of tolerance, therefore, addresses
these tendencies directly, contrasting them with his own program of precise and
explicit rules:
Our attitude to demands of this kind may be stated generally by the principle
of tolerance: we do not want to impose restrictions but to state conventions. . .
In logic there are no morals. Everyone can construct his logic, i.e. his language
form, however he wants. If we wants to discuss it with us, though, he will have
to make precise how we wants to set things up. He has to give syntactic rules
rather than philosophical considerations. (ibid., p. 45)
Only by replacing the vague concept with a precise equivalent can the practical
merits or drawbacks of a proposal be judged, for some defined purpose.And under the
new regime of pluralism, where there can be no criterion of inherent “correctness”,
practical usefulness is the only criterion left for deciding whether a proposal should
be pursued or left aside. The principle of tolerance fits well, then, into the project of
“rational reconstruction” pursued by the earlier Vienna Circle, and sets the stage for
the successor project of “explication”, which Carnap would not formulate explicitly
until after 1945.31 And he is careful to apply the insistence on precision to his own
31 The classical exposition of this project is in Chapter 1 of Logical Foundations of Probability
(Carnap, 1950a); for further discussion, see Stein (1992), Awodey and Carus (2004), section III, and
Carus (2004), section II.
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work as well. Attention and criticism should be focussed, he repeatedly insists, not on
the “inexact” informal reflections in the text, but on the precise definitions given in
terms of the proposed calculi.
Unlikeprevious revolutions inCarnap’s thought, this onewaspermanent; it became
the basis of his thought for the remainder of his career. And it extended, as we have
seen, far beyond logic itself into epistemology and such questions as the form of the
observation language. It represents the final step away from the meaning foundation-
alism of the Tractatus to a kind of radical pragmatism, in which the only criterion for
acceptance or rejection of a language form is its usefulness for a particular purpose.
This conception was only partially spelled out in the Logical Syntax itself. Indeed, it
was never fully articulated in detail by Carnap, but only indicated very generally in
such later writings as “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” and certain replies to
critics in the Schilpp volume.32
5 Tensions within the published Logical Syntax
We began in Sect. 1 with a conception of meaning whereby it is built up from
atomic components. One could call this view, which was derived from a reading of
Wittgenstein (though it may not have been his own), a “meaning foundationalism”.
The meanings of all sentences rest on the representation of atomic facts by atomic
sentences. We interpreted the new view Carnap arrived at during his sleepless night
in January 1931 as the replacement of this meaning foundationalism by an axiomatic
approach to language as a whole, in which all workings of the language are exhaus-
tively specified by explicit rules stated in a meta-language. In its original statement,
this “syntax” view completely excluded the possibility of “meaning”—in its old sense
of representational correspondence between configurations of linguistic objects and
configurations of objects in the world. There seemed noway of capturing any such cor-
respondence in explicit formation or transformation rules for a language. Only a year
after the Syntax book was published, though, Tarski’s definition of truth suggested
to Carnap that such correspondences could, after all, be captured in meta-linguistic
rules. This amounted to defining a new notion of meaning “from above”, in contrast to
the one built up “from below” in the meaning foundationalism Carnap had rejected
in January 1931. In this new scheme, the language itself was constituted by a system
of rules which in turn permitted the rigorous specification of an “interpretation”, as
opposed to regarding the rules as descriptive and determined by a more fundamental
notion of meaning built up from atomic components.
In January 1931, the rejection of meaning foundationalism and its replacement
by an axiomatic view was all of a piece. Seen from the later, semantical perspective,
though, this original syntax view could be regarded, retrospectively, as having been
composed of a number of different elements that would later turn out to be sepa-
rable. First, there was (a) the requirement that a language be entirely specified by
explicit rules. But the “syntactic” view that seemed to follow from this can in retro-
spect be seen as having consisted of two separable parts: (b) the distinction between a
language (a calculus, a purely syntactic symbol system) and its interpretation, and
32 There is widespread agreement about the continuity of Carnap’s overall philosophical program
from the time of the Syntax; see e.g. Creath (1990), Ricketts (1996b). Carus (forthcoming) attempts a
more systematic exposition of this later program.
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(c) the prohibition of reference to the latter, and the restriction of the (wissenschafts-
logische) meta-language to consideration of the former.
Components (a) and (b) are necessary pre-conditions for the tolerance idea.
Without the requirement that language be specified by explicit rules, the alterna-
tives among which tolerance is recommended are not fully specified. And without
distinguishing language from content, there are no clearly distinct alternatives to
be tolerant among. These two retrospectively visible components survive unscathed
and undiminished into Carnap’s semantic period. (So it is rather misleading to call
them “syntactic”; Carnap’s original term “metalogical” might be more appropriate.)
Component (c), on the other hand, the overreaction against Wittgensteinian “mean-
ing” that accompanied the original insight, did not survive. In distinguishing between
a language and its interpretation, Carnap’s first (and, as we saw, understandable)
response was to reject that imprecise notion of meaning entirely. But this restriction
was loosened when he saw that, in virtue of the precise specification of the object
language, interpretations could also be specified by explicit rules (governing satis-
faction, designation, and truth), in accordance with component (a) of the original
syntax idea.
The original rejection of “meaning” had proscribed what seemed an occult prop-
erty, just like the rejection by Lavoisier of the traditional explanation of burning as the
release of a substance (“phlogiston”, in Stahl’s theory) into the surrounding air. The
reinstatement of an explicated account of “meaning” reflected the realization that
the informal idea of meaning had not itself been the culprit, but rather a particular,
somewhat obscure conception of it (Wittgenstein’s, in the Circle’s view). But the new
explication of meaning met the standards by which the previous conception had been
rejected. In the same way, the later reinstatement of the idea that burning (oxidation)
involved the release of electrons by the substance being oxidized met the standards
of the post-Lavoisier principle of the conservation of matter, by which all reactions
are regarded as recombinations of indestructible atoms. The new explication of the
informal concept of “meaning” has no more in common with the previous occult
property than electrons do with phlogiston.
Of the components of the original syntax idea, then, the two “metalogical” ones—
(a) and (b)—are consistent with tolerance, while the rejection of meaning—
component (c)—is inconsistent with tolerance. This tension is nowhere close to the
surface in the published Syntax book, largely because these components of the original
view, tolerance and the rejection of meaning, occupy different sections of the book,
and never meet. In the famous introduction that we quoted from above, tolerance is
highlighted. In the opening chapters and in the exposition of Language I, the rejection
of meaning comes to the fore, except in §§16–17, in which tolerance is again in the
spotlight. The exposition of Language II is largely neutral and technical, though in a
few sections (e.g. §38) certain provisions (e.g. the elimination of classes) are implicitly
defended as “correct”. Section 4 of the book, on general syntax, is again dominated
by tolerance; the optional nature of many different kinds of logical and mathematical
systems is stressed. And in Sect. 5, finally, on “Philosophy and Syntax”, the emphasis
is almost entirely on the exclusion of meaning (the restriction to the “formal mode
of speech”); tolerance hardly makes an appearance. Since this last section was by far
the most widely read, it captured the imagination of philosophers. The distinction
between “formal” and “material” modes of speech, introduced in “Die physikalische
Sprache” (Unity of Science) in 1932, is discussed in more detail and applied to a wide
range of philosophical problems. This distinction, of course, relies on the exclusion of
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meaning, and is thus incompatible with the principle of tolerance.33 This absence of
confrontation between tolerance and the rejection of meaning is not by design, but
resulted straightforwardly from the order of composition; part V was largely written
before the October 1932 turn to tolerance, while part IV was written in 1933.34
While the original syntax idea was a necessary precondition for tolerance, then,
one component of it (and, in the book, the most visibly high-profile component)
would soon be jettisoned. This gave the appearance that the “syntax” doctrine—iden-
tified with the exclusion of meaning—had first been embraced, and then rejected
again. “Meaning” was proscribed in 1931, it seemed, and then became acceptable
again in 1935. What most observers failed to notice in this sequence of events was
the permanence of the “metalogical” (or “top-down”) components and the principle
of tolerance consequent upon them. The rejection of meaning foundationalism in
January 1931—Quine’s second “dogma of empiricism”—was permanent; as we saw
above, the main point of January 1931 had been the “elimination of verification by
comparison with facts” (Sect. 2 above, final paragraph).35
Seen from this perspective, in fact, it becomes apparent that Carnap’s abandon-
ment of Quine’s first “dogma” followed soon after; as we saw above (Sect. 3), the
principle of tolerance was suggested by Carnap’s recognition that there could be no
language-transcendent notion of analyticity of the kind he had attempted in the first
draft of the Syntax book. The idea of a single, canonical definition of analyticity was
just what hegave up in October 1932, after Gödel’s critique. Thereafter, analyticity is
strictly language-relative. And this step was also permanent. It would appear, then,
that Quine’s supposed “two dogmas” were precisely the two components of the Witt-
gensteinian “absolutist” conception that Carnap, underGödel’s influence, left behind,
successively, in January 1931 and October 1932.36
33 As Carnap himself recognized, though he played it down; see Carnap, 1942, p. 250, where he
discusses the possibility of “supplementing” the translation of material-mode sentences into formal-
mode ones with translations into semantic and pragmatic sentences. He never actually attempted
anything like this, however, for reasons well diagnosed by Ricketts (1996b), p. 247 and Goldfarb
(1997), pp. 63–65. Indeed, his statement that “The explanation of the dangers of the material mode
of speech . . . in §§78–80 remains valid” (ibid.) seems absurd, on the surface, given that the “material
mode of speech” is defined in Syntax as non-syntactic (Carnap, 1934, pp. 212–213); i.e. it includes
semantic sentences. This statement becomes reasonable, though, if we look at §§78–80 and realize
that the instances of the “material mode of speech” considered there are nearly all philosophical
(specifically ontological) ones of the kind he would later call “external” questions (Carnap, 1950b,
p. 206). The translations into the “formal mode” offered there can nearly all be regarded as plausible
translations of ontological “external” questions into a form that lends itself to their transformation
into “practical questions of language choice”. But in 1934 they are not yet stated as explicitly practical
questions; they are stated as purely syntactic. This is an obvious difference.
34 A detailed chronology of the book’s composition was drawn up by Carnap and is preserved in his
papers, ASP/RC 110-04-08 and 110-04-09.
35 The second dogma is explicitly identifiedwith the “verification theory ofmeaning” inQuine (1951),
p. 41. We hope to make this case in more detail—for both of Quine’s “dogmas”—in a subsequent
paper.
36 We are grateful to the Philosophy Department of the University of Constance (Germany), and
especially to the participants in the seminar “Carnap der Logizist” in the summer semester of 2003,
during which the present paper was largely written. We also thank Thomas Ricketts and Wilfried
Sieg for helpful comments on earlier drafts, as well as those who attended talks and seminars where
versions of this paper were given, at Stanford, Purdue, Jena, Paris, and the 2003 ASL meeting in
Chicago.
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